The deterioration in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations has taken a sharp turn, marking a stark contrast to the initial optimism when Pakistani military and civilian leaders welcomed the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in August 2021. At that time, Islamabad anticipated that a Taliban government would serve as a strategic ally, providing a buffer against potential security threats. This expectation was rooted in Pakistan’s long-standing support for the Taliban movement, which had been nurtured over more than two decades.
This relationship, however, was always complex. While Pakistan officially aligned with U.S.-backed governments in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021, it simultaneously allowed the Taliban and other militant groups to operate within its borders. This dual approach reflected a broader contradiction in Pakistan’s foreign policy, one that sought to balance regional stability with covert support for insurgent networks.
The current state of affairs, however, signals a complete breakdown. The Pakistani air force recently targeted locations in Kabul, an unprecedented move that underscores the deepening mistrust between the two nations. The collapse of their once-collaborative relationship is attributed to a growing disconnect in mutual expectations and a lack of respect for each other’s capabilities.
The Pakistani security establishment, led by the army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), plays a central role in shaping the country’s Afghan policy. Historically, the military has exerted considerable influence over civilian leadership, even during periods of democratic governance. This power dynamic has shaped Pakistan’s approach to Afghanistan, often prioritizing national security over diplomatic considerations.
Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Pakistan has experienced a surge in attacks on its security forces. Over 2,400 casualties were recorded in the first three quarters of 2025, surpassing the total from the previous year. Most of these attacks have been attributed to the TTP (Taliban of Pakistan), whose leadership is based in Afghanistan. Many TTP members originate from the tribal regions along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
Pakistan had hoped that the establishment of a Taliban government in Kabul would lead to the departure of TTP leaders from Afghanistan. Some did return, but this did not result in a decline in violence. The TTP continues to demand the implementation of Islamic law and the restoration of the semi-autonomous status of the tribal areas. For Pakistan, the ongoing insurgency poses a serious national security challenge, compounded by economic stagnation, geopolitical tensions with India, domestic unrest, and natural disasters.
The Taliban, meanwhile, insist that the TTP is a domestic issue for Pakistan to address. In 2022, the Taliban facilitated talks between TTP leaders and the Pakistani military in Kabul, which initially showed promise with a temporary ceasefire. However, these efforts ultimately failed, further straining bilateral ties.
The Taliban government faces significant challenges in governing a country that remains economically underdeveloped and politically isolated. Russia is the only nation that has formally recognized the Taliban administration, though several other countries, including China, India, and Iran, have acknowledged the group as Afghanistan’s de facto rulers. Despite this, the Taliban struggle with economic instability, collapsing public services, and humanitarian crises exacerbated by funding cuts to UN-led aid programs.
A prolonged conflict with Pakistan could worsen these conditions, further destabilizing the region. Both sides appear entrenched in their positions, with temporary ceasefires serving more as tactical pauses than genuine efforts to resolve the conflict. Official Pakistani statements now refer to the Taliban as a “regime” rather than a legitimate government, calling for a more “inclusive” administration in Afghanistan and warning of continued attacks if the Taliban fail to act against the TTP.
Pakistan’s military superiority, combined with recent successes in its conflict with India, has bolstered its confidence. The country also holds leverage through its large Afghan refugee population, many of whom have lived in Pakistan for generations. Expelling these refugees could be a powerful tool in negotiations with the Taliban.
Pakistani leaders view their country as a strong and influential actor with global alliances, expecting any Afghan government to respect and cooperate with them. Conversely, the Taliban see themselves as victors who successfully resisted foreign occupation and are unlikely to yield easily to a neighbor’s demands.
Taliban spokesmen have pushed back against Pakistan’s narrative, accusing the country of harboring ISIL fighters in its tribal areas. They also emphasize the importance of information warfare, highlighting the ideological and social bonds between the Taliban and the TTP.
Despite these tensions, both countries remain interdependent. Afghanistan relies heavily on trade routes through Pakistan, which have been disrupted due to the current standoff. The Taliban lack the military capabilities to counter Pakistani aerial incursions, leaving them vulnerable to further strikes.
Pakistan continues to frame its fight against the TTP as part of a broader confrontation with India, alleging without evidence that the group is backed by New Delhi. It also expects the Taliban to distance themselves from the TTP and align with Islamabad.
However, the TTP and Taliban share a long history of collaboration, ideological alignment, and social ties. A conflict between the two could create opportunities for other extremist groups, such as ISKP, to gain influence.
While Pakistan holds military advantages, the Taliban possess their own means of retaliation. For instance, if the Taliban’s supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhunzada, were to issue a fatwa calling for war against Pakistan’s security establishment, it could trigger widespread unrest. The TTP has already pledged allegiance to him, and his religious authority is respected among many Pakistani religious figures.
Islamist political groups in Pakistan would likely oppose an all-out war with the Taliban, and sustained Pakistani attacks could actually strengthen the Taliban’s position domestically. As such, neither side can afford a full-scale conflict.
To prevent further escalation, there is an urgent need for a neutral mediator capable of facilitating meaningful dialogue. Middle Eastern and Muslim nations such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which are trusted by both sides, are well-suited for this role. Recent mediation efforts by these countries have shown promise, with the Taliban ceasing retaliatory attacks against Pakistan following discussions in New Delhi.
Ultimately, the path to peace requires a genuine desire for reconciliation from both Pakistani and Afghan leaders. While the two nations continue to exchange threats and engage in cross-border skirmishes, they are acutely aware of the heavy costs of war.
Geography and history bind Afghans and Pakistanis together, creating a shared destiny that must be leveraged for mutual benefit. Governments must move beyond failed approaches and work toward a more cooperative relationship. Afghan leaders must seek amicability with Pakistan, while Pakistani leaders should pursue a comprehensive foreign policy toward Afghanistan that transcends rivalry with India.
The world cannot afford another war in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Peace, not conflict, offers the best hope for stability and prosperity in the region.
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